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invasion. The swiftness with which Germany implemented a scorched-earth
policy designed to eliminate all traces of
Polish society is truly breathtaking. Evans convincingly argues that the “final
solution” was well under way by the
time the notorious Wannsee Conference convened in January 1942.
Wannsee was merely an attempt to
eliminate bureaucratic infighting and
reinforce the authority of Hitler’s point
man, Reinhard Heydrich, for the
Holocaust.
Evans has written the kind of book to
which all scholars aspire. It is a volume
in which a lifetime of research and writing comes together in a powerful, and
at times moving, manner. It is a book
that is sure to become a classic.
STEPHEN KNOTT

Naval War College

Adams, John A. If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific
War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy.
Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008. 472pp.
$34.95

It is said of Secretary of War Henry
Stimson that in World War II he “frequently seemed to retire from the realm
of logic into a dim religious world in
which Neptune was God, Mahan his
prophet, and the United States Navy
was the only true Church.” Now we can
judge the validity of that comment,
thanks to John Adams’s If Mahan Ran
the Great Pacific War. Adams grades
both the U.S. force and its opponent,
the Imperial Japanese Navy (another
service professing Mahanian orthodoxy), according to their respective adherence to the sacred text. The result is
a lively, interesting exercise in
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counterfactual history, one that deals
both with what occurred and what
might have occurred had the high commands of both navies been more true to
what one might call “the revealed
Word.”
Counterfactual history is suspect to
many historians, who feel they have
enough problems figuring out what actually happened, let alone considering
what could have happened. However,
the Strategy and Policy course at the
Naval War College thinks differently,
seeking a host of alternatives. Adams essentially agrees, possibly because he is a
business executive and not a professional historian; he has written this excellent book as an avocation (more
power to him). “War is too important
to be left to the generals,” said Clemenceau in World War I. History is too important to be left to historians, if they
will not write about counterfactual
contingencies.
My reservations about this book are
slight but do exist. Excuse my sacrilege,
but having taught for twenty years at
the U.S. Army Staff College, I cannot
help thinking that there might be occasions when Mahan’s precepts could be
insufficient. Take his well known injunction, “Don’t divide the fleet.”
Admiral William F. Halsey took this to
heart when he was in command of the
Third Fleet at the largest naval battle in
human history—Leyte Gulf, in late October 1944. As all readers of this journal
know, Halsey took his entire force with
him to chase down a decoy rather than
divide it and provide a blocking force of
battleships and escort carriers to prevent a Japanese exit from the San
Bernardino Strait. Since Mahan, presumably, cannot be wrong, the blame
must fall to Halsey, for not realizing
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that his fleet was so powerful that he
could divide it and still sustain local superiority. However, because Mahan
never considered a situation such as
this, one must judge him inadequate as
a guide in the last year of the great
Pacific War.
“No plan survives first major contact
with the enemy,” wrote Helmut von
Moltke the Elder, chief of the German
General Staff in the mid-nineteenth
century. If this be true of plans, which
are far less abstract than theories,
should one expect that Mahan provides
adequate direction through all the contingencies that a warrior might face?
MICHAEL PEARLMAN

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(Retired)

Parkinson, Roger. The Late Victorian Navy: The
Pre-dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First
World War. New York: Boydell, 2008. 323pp.
$145

Roger Parkinson’s study of the Royal
Navy from 1878 to the 1890s provides a
useful overview of a period in British
naval history that is sometimes seen as a
neglected “Dark Age.” He takes issue
with the standard work of the period,
Arthur Marder’s first book, British Naval Policy, 1880–1905: The Anatomy of
British Sea-Power (1940). In this published version of his University of
Exeter doctoral thesis completed under
Dr. Michael Duffy, Parkinson expands
on the insights of Oscar Parkes, Bryan
Ranft, Donald M. Schurman, Paul M.
Kennedy, N. A. M. Rodger, Jon T.
Sumida, and John Beeler with his own
detailed research work in parliamentary
papers, the Admiralty and Cabinet

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss4/19

171

Office files at the National Archives,
Kew, and the private papers of Lord
Salisbury, Britain’s prime minister in
1885, 1886–92, 1895–1902, at Hatfield
House.
Parkinson’s central focus is on the
background and the effect of Britain’s
Naval Defence Act of 1889 in the period
that has come to be called––and even
dismissed as––the “pre-Dreadnought”
era. He is reported to be preparing a
follow-up work that will focus on the
era of HMS Dreadnought from 1906 onward. In the volume at hand, Parkinson
argues that most historians of the period have accepted too easily Arthur
Marder’s picture of Britain’s relative
naval weakness in comparison with
other European naval powers. In particular, Parkinson shows that Britain was
not by any means a weak naval power
and that W. T. Stead’s famous articles
in the Pall Mall Gazette of 1884 were
based on a gross exaggeration of the actual state of affairs. The key consideration, he points out, was maintaining a
naval force that was equal to that of the
next two largest naval powers, France
and Russia. The effort to maintain that
margin of supremacy in terms of naval
expenditures, tonnage, and warship
numbers resulted in the Naval Defense
Act in 1889. Parkinson maintains this
was the spark that ignited the naval race
that lasted until the Washington naval
arms-limitation treaty of 1922. As a result, Britain’s strategic situation
changed from one that was a relatively
stable balance between Britain facing
France and Russia up to the 1880s to
one of the late 1890s and early twentieth century that became a “strategic
melting pot with not three but eight
major naval powers––Britain, France,
Russia, America, Germany, Japan, Italy,
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